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Abstract—We prove that a known approach to improve
Shamir’s celebrated secret sharing scheme; i.e., adding an
information-theoretic authentication tag to the secret, can make
it robust for n parties against any collusion of size δn, for any
constant δ ∈ (0, 1/2). This result holds in the so-called “non-
rushing” model in which the n shares are submitted simultane-
ously for reconstruction. We thus finally obtain a simple, fully
explicit, and robust secret sharing scheme in this model that
is essentially optimal in all parameters including the share size
which is k(1+o(1))+O(κ), where k is the secret length and κ is
the security parameter. Like Shamir’s scheme, in this modified
scheme any set of more than δn honest parties can efficiently
recover the secret.
Using algebraic geometry codes instead of Reed-Solomon
codes, the share length can be decreased to a constant (only
depending on δ) while the number of shares n can grow
independently. In this case, when n is large enough, the scheme
satisfies the “threshold” requirement in an approximate sense;
i.e., any set of δn(1 + ρ) honest parties, for arbitrarily small
ρ > 0, can efficiently reconstruct the secret.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret sharing, introduced by the seminal works of Shamir
[1] and Blackley [2], is the following problem (in its most
basic formulation): Suppose we wish to encode and distribute
a secret s ∈ Fk2 among n parties in such a way that i) the n
parties can reconstruct the original secret s by revealing their
respective shares; and, ii) for some integer parameter t > 0
(called the privacy parameter), any group of t parties cannot
infer any information about the secret from their collection
of shares. Shamir proposed a beautiful scheme that provides
an optimal solution to the problem. The scheme regards the
secret as an element of the finite field FQ, for some prime
power Q ≥ n, and then samples a uniformly random univariate
polynomial of degree t over FQ with the constant term set to
be s. The secrecy follows by observing that in this scheme,
the secret is encoded, after random padding, using a Reed-
Solomon code which is MDS.
Due to its coding-theoretic nature, Shamir’s scheme pro-
vides at least two additional benefits. First, any group of parties
is able to recover s as long as the size of the group is larger
than t. This so-called “threshold property” is due to the fact
that the Reed-Solomon code is an MDS code. Second, any
Reed-Solomon code of rate R is able to tolerate any fraction of
errors up to (1−R)/2 and this can be achieved by an efficient
decoder (such as the Berlekamp–Massey decoding algorithm,
cf. [3, Chapter 6]). As a result, a straightforward calculation
shows that Shamir’s secret sharing scheme is robust, in the
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sense that it can tolerate any less than 1/3 fraction of dishonest
parties. That is, the correct secret s can be reconstructed even
if any less than 1/3 fraction of the parties reveal their shares
incorrectly. In fact, this holds true even if the malicious parties
are able to arbitrarily communicate with each other and choose
the incorrect shares adversarially.
A. Previous work
The robust notion of secret sharing has been studied in
the literature, and some of the key results in the area are
summarized in Table I. It is known that robust secret sharing
is impossible when the fraction of dishonest parties is at
least 1/2 [4]. It is also impossible to always reconstruct the
secret correctly (i.e., with probability 1) when the fraction of
dishonest parties may be 1/3 or larger, in which case a small
probability of error η > 0 is unavoidable. Therefore, Shamir’s
scheme provides optimal robustness for a scheme with zero
probability of error.
When an honest majority exists, Rabin and Ben-Or [5]
provide a scheme based on Shamir’s combined with message
authentication codes. The share length q := logQ in this
scheme is, ignoring small terms, k + Ω(n log(1/η)), where
η > 0 is the probability of incorrect reconstruction. In contrast,
an appealing feature of Shamir’s scheme is that the shares
are compact; namely, the bit length of each share is equal
to the bit length of the secret (under the natural assumption
that n ≤ 2k). This turns out to be optimal for schemes with
perfect privacy satisfying the threshold property [6]. Another
scheme, due to Cramer et al. [7] (and based on [8] and
also using Shamir’s scheme) improves the share length to
max{k,O(n + log(1/η))}. However, the reconstruction time
for this scheme is in general exponential in n (more precisely,
at least
(
n
t
)
), and the scheme is secure only against non-
rushing1 adversaries (cf. [9]). Cevallos et al. [9] propose a
scheme similar to [5] that achieves more compact shares,
namely of length k + O(log(1/η) + n(log n + log k)). This
scheme provides efficient share and reconstruction procedures.
Jhanwar and Safavi-Naini [10] consider a model in which
all parties (including the adversary) have access to public,
shared, randomness. They construct information-theoretically
optimal secret sharing schemes in this model by re-encoding
Shamir’s shares using the available public randomness. This
construction achieves the same share length as Shamir’s while
providing privacy and robustness against any collusion of size
less than n/2.
1In the non-rushing model, all shares are submitted simultaneously at the
reconstruction stage.
Cramer et al. [11] introduce the notion of algebraic ma-
nipulation detection (AMD) codes, which is a natural variant
of error-detection codes in situations where the adversary’s
perturbations on a codeword are chosen independently of the
codeword. By using this primitive as a pre-code in Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme (or any secret sharing scheme with
linear decoder), they are able to make the scheme robust
against adversarial manipulations. The key difference in their
model is the notion of robustness; i.e., the requirement is that
if the adversary corrupts any of the shares, the reconstruction
should detect the adversary and fail (rather than output the
correct share) with high probability. More recently, Lewko and
Pastro [12] defined a variation of robust secret sharing in which
the robustness requirement is against local adversaries. That
is, the error in each share corrupted by the adversary can only
depend on the particular share being corrupted. They show
that even in this restricted model, the minimum required share
length is k + log(1/η) − O(1) (under the standard threshold
assumption that any set of t+1 must reconstruct the secret with
probability at least 1−η). Furthermore, they construct efficient
schemes in the local model that attains a nearly optimal share
length of k +O(log(1/η)).
In another recent work, Cramer et al. [13] combine AMD
codes with universal hash functions and (folded) list de-
codable codes to construct a secret sharing scheme with
potentially constant share length (more precisely, share length
Θ(1 + log(1/η)/n)). Their construction is with respect to a
randomly chosen hash function from a universal family and is
thus a Monte-Carlo construction. That is, the code construction
relies on the probabilistic method (and thus may not result in
the desired secret sharing scheme with unfortunate choices
of the randomness). However, the encoder and decoders are
efficient once the randomness of the code construction is set to
an appropriate choice. Moreover, this construction considers
the “ramp model” in which it is not necessary to be able
to reconstruct the secret from any t + 1 of the shares. This
relaxation is in fact necessary for any secret sharing scheme
with share length smaller than the secret length k.
Recently, Safavi-Naini and Wang [14] construct secret shar-
ing schemes based on codes for the wiretap channel problem
for the case n = 2t+ 1. This construction is based on wiretap
codes that are in turn based on list decodable Reed-Solomon
codes, subspace-evasive sets and AMD codes, and attains a
share length of k +O(n2(log n)(log log n) + n log(1/η)).
B. Our contributions
In this work, we construct an essentially optimal robust
secret sharing scheme against possibly adaptive2, non-rushing
adversaries. Somewhat surprisingly, our construction turns out
to be strikingly similar to some of the known constructions
mentioned in §I-A. More precisely, the construction first
amends the secret with a tag using an AMD code. Then, it
uses Shamir’s scheme to encode the result into mn shares,
for a carefully chosen integer parameter m > 1. Finally, the
2Note that adaptivity refers to the adversary’s strategy in observing shares.
resulting shares are bundled into n groups of size m each
which are distributed among the n parties. In other words,
we use a variant of Shamir’s scheme based on folded Reed-
Solomon codes (instead of plain Reed-Solomon codes) com-
bined with an AMD pre-code. This is very similar to what used
in [11] to provide robustness in the sense of error-detection, as
well as the coding-theoretic construction of Safavi-Naini and
Wang [14] (the latter additionally uses subspace-evasive sets
that we do not need). Combining Shamir’s scheme with some
type of information-theoretic pre-code (such as a message
authentication code) can also be seen as the underlying idea
of other existing constructions such as [7].
The techniques that we use are remarkably simple to de-
scribe as well. To prove robustness, we first use an efficient
list decoding algorithm of folded Reed-Solomon codes [15]
to show that the reconstruction procedure always outputs a
short list containing an AMD encoding of the correct secret.
Second, we use an elegant observation by Guruswami and
Smith [16] that was used by them to construct “stochastic”
error-correcting codes. The observation is that, for any list
decodable code that is linear over some base field, the list of
potential messages corresponding to the any given received
word is the translation of the original message by elements of
a set that only depends on the noise vector. In particular, the
list of potential messages, shifted by the correct message, is
only determined by the code and the error vector chosen by
the adversary. For our application in secret sharing, privacy
of Shamir’s scheme implies that the perturbations of the
adversary, and thus the set of error vectors in the message
domain, must be independent of the original message and the
internal randomness of the AMD code. As a result, the error
detection guarantee of the AMD code ensures that, with high
probability, all the incorrect potential messages are correctly
identified by the reconstruction procedure so that only the
correct secret remains in the end.
Our construction and underlying ideas share an overlap
with the above-mentioned recent result of Cramer et al. [13]
in which the authors construct a Monte-Carlo secret sharing
scheme with small share length in the ramp model. The
Ref. Share length Efficient? (restrictions)
[1] k Yes (t < n/3)
[10] k No
[11] k +O(log(1/η)) Yes (only error detection)
[12] k +O(log(1/η)) Yes (only local adversaries)
[8] k +O(n+ log(1/η)) No
[9] k + O˜(n+ log(1/η)) Yes
[5] k +O(n log(1/η)) Yes
[14] k + O˜(n2 + n log(1/η)) Yes
[13] O(1) Yes (Monte-Carlo)
This work k(1 + o(1)) +O(log(1/η)) Yes (Corollary 10)
This work O(1) Yes (Corollary 13)
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF RESULTS IN ROBUST SECRET SHARING SCHEME, AND THEIR
KEY FEATURES AND LIMITATIONS. THE PARAMETER t IS THE PRIVACY
PARAMETER, n IS THE NUMBER OF SHARES AND η IS THE ERROR
PROBABILITY OF RECONSTRUCTION.
construction in this work also uses a list decodable code
and an AMD layer, in addition to a randomly chosen linear
hashing layer. In particular, the secret along with the AMD
tag is randomly “un-hashed” via a randomly chosen hash
function (known in advance to all parties), and then the
result is encoded using a list decodable code. This results
in an insignificant increase in the share length. But more
importantly, the result is a Monte-Carlo construction; i.e.,
the choice of the hash function is not explicitly defined but
rather it is shown that “most” choices of the hash function
are satisfactory. This result also focuses on shares of constant
length which necessarily results in a ramp scheme. Our con-
struction completely eliminates the hashing stage and also can
be instantiated for a wide range of the parameters, including
those obtained in [13]. Thus we obtain a fully explicit, and
technically simple, construction of efficient secret sharing
schemes with nearly optimal parameters in all aspects. Our
main result is as follows:
Theorem 1: (Corollary 10, rephrased) Let δ < 1/2 be any
fixed constant. For any η > 0, there is an efficient, robust and
perfectly private secret sharing scheme with n shares, secret
length k, and share length q ≤ k(1 + o(1)) + O(log(1/η))
that is secure with privacy parameter t = δn, attaining a
reconstruction error of at most η.
Same as Shamir’s scheme and [14], our result does not nec-
essarily require the observations of the adversary to coincide or
overlap with the set of manipulated shares. In fact, the number
of adaptive observations by the adversary may in general be
different from the number of incorrect shares.
Although a share length of at least k bits is necessary for
any robust secret sharing scheme [6] (even against local, or
oblivious, adversaries [12]), it is possible to obtain smaller
shares at cost of slightly relaxing the threshold property. That
is, instead of requiring the secret to be reconstructible (either
with probability 1 or close to 1) from any set of more than
t shares, we may require reconstructability from any set of
more than t + g shares, for a small “gap” parameter g. We
adapt our secret sharing scheme to nonzero gap parameters
and, moreover, show that when g is a small fraction of n, the
alphabet size may be reduced to an absolute constant. This is
achieved by using folded algebraic geometry codes instead of
Reed-Solomon codes, and as a result, we prove the following:
Theorem 2: (Corollary 13, rephrased) For any constant
ρ > 0, and any δ ≤ 1/2 − ρ, there is a constant q = Oρ(1)
such that the following holds. There is a robust and perfectly
private secret sharing scheme with n shares, secret length
k, and share length O(q), attaining a reconstruction error
of η = exp(−Ω(ρnq)), provided that n ≥ k/(ρq). The
scheme satisfies the threshold property in an approximate
sense; namely, that the secret can be reconstructed (with
probability 1) given any set of t + ρn shares. The scheme
is efficient given polynomial (in n) amount of pre-processed
information about the scheme.
Previously, the best known construction achieving small
share length was due to Cramer et al. [13] in which the share
length is Θ(1 + log(1/η)/n) and thus grows with the security
parameter (see Table I). Moreover, as mentioned above, this
construction is not fully explicit and requires a randomly
chosen hash function that is fixed once and for all and there
is no clear efficient way of explicitly finding an appropriate
hash function.
The efficiency of our scheme is dictated by the efficiency
of the underlying list decoding algorithm for algebraic ge-
ometry codes. Naturally, any subsequent improvements in list
decoding algorithms of folded algebraic geometry (and for
that matter, folded Reed-Solomon) codes would automati-
cally improve the performance of the above secret sharing
schemes (information theoretically, one may hope to achieve
n = 2t + O(1) for threshold schemes using better codes).
We remark that the natural idea of reducing share length by
using algebraic geometry codes rather than Reed-Solomon
codes in secret sharing schemes dates back to a result of
Chen and Cramer [17] and has been extensively studied
since (cf. [18]), especially in the context of arithmetic secure
multiparty computation.
Remark 3: After the original draft of this work appeared
online, Bishop et al. [19]3 used different (and quite in-
volved) techniques to construct an efficient robust secret
sharing scheme with close-to-optimal share length of k +
O(log(1/η)(log4 n+log3 n log k)) for the case n = 2t+1 and
where the set of t observed and corrupted shares are the same.
It can be argued that our work is conceptually simpler, proving
that a natural modification of Shamir’s original scheme that
had been proposed as early as 2008 [11] in fact achieves
essentially optimal parameters. Thus a particular significance
of our work is in showing that existing secret sharing systems
that rely on Shamir’s original scheme can be improved to
nearly optimal ones with little change in the implementation
(i.e., by simply tagging the original data with an optimal AMD
code).
II. ROBUST SECRET SHARING SCHEMES AND AMD CODES
In this section, we describe the basic notions that are used
in the paper, including the exact definition of robust secret
sharing schemes that we use. More formal definitions appear
in the full version of this work. The general notion of coding
schemes is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (coding scheme): A pair of functions
(Enc,Dec) where Enc : Fk2 ×F`2 → Fn2q , and Dec : (F2q ∪{⊥
})n → Fk2 ∪ {⊥} is called a coding scheme if for all s ∈ Fk2
and all z ∈ F`2, we have Dec(Enc(s, z)) = s. The function Enc
and Dec are respectively called the encoder and the decoder,
and parameters k and q are respectively called the message
length and the symbol length. We use the notation Enc(s)
to denote the random variable Enc(s, Z) when Z is sampled
uniformly at random from F`2. The coding scheme is called
efficient if Enc,Dec can be computed in polynomial time in
nq. The rate of the coding scheme is the quantity k/(nq).
Definition 5 (robust secret sharing scheme): A robust secret
sharing scheme with secret length k, share length q, and num-
ber of shares n is a coding scheme (Share,Rec) with message
3This work also claims a flaw in the security proof of [10].
length k, symbol length q and block length n satisfying the
following:
1) Adaptive privacy: For a parameter t (known as the
privacy parameter), and for any “secret” s ∈ Fk2 , an
adversary who (possibly adaptively) observes any up to
t of the shares gains no information about the secret s.
2) Robustness: For a parameter d (known as the robust-
ness parameter), an adversary who arbitrarily corrupts
up to any d of the shares (possibly after adaptively
observing any t of the shares) cannot make Rec output
an incorrect secret with probability more than η, where
η is called the robustness error parameter. The scheme
satisfies perfect robustness if η = 0.
The quantity log(1/max{η, }) is called the security pa-
rameter of the scheme. We say the scheme satisfies the
threshold property with gap g if the secret can be reconstructed
from any set of t + g + 1 shares. If g = 0, we say that the
scheme satisfies a sharp threshold. Otherwise, the scheme is
called a ramp scheme.
Definition 6 (AMD (algebraic manipulation detection)
code): [11] A binary coding scheme (Enc,Dec) with message
length k and block length n is an AMD code with error η
if for every message s ∈ Fk2 and every ∆ ∈ Fn2 , we have
Pr(Dec(Enc(s) + ∆) /∈ {s,⊥}) ≤ η, where the probability is
taken over the internal randomness of Enc.
Theorem 7: [11] For every k and parameter η > 0, there is
an efficient AMD code with message length k and encoder of
the form Enc(s, z) = (s, z, f(s, z)) for some f : Fk2 × Fq2 →
F
q
2 such that q = O(log(1/η)).
III. THE CONSTRUCTION
The following is the main technical tool used by our
constructions, in which we prove that a combination of AMD
codes with linear list decodable codes can be used to construct
robust secret sharing schemes.
Theorem 8: There is a constant c0 > 0 such that the
following holds for any integer k > 0 and parameter η > 0.
For some Q = 2q and m | q, let C ⊆ FnQ be an explicit FQ1/m -
linear code with rate R that is efficiently list decodable from
any δ fraction of errors with list size bounded by L and has
minimum distance d > δn. Moreover, suppose C has a sub-
code C′ ⊆ FnQ that, over FQ1/m , is linear with dual distance
at least tm+ 1 and rate R′ ≤ R− 1/n satisfying
(R−R′)nq ≥ k + c0 log(L/η). (1)
Then, there is an efficient and perfectly private robust secret
sharing scheme (Share,Rec) with secret length k and n
shares, share length q, privacy parameter t, robustness δn,
and robustness error η. Moreover, the scheme satisfies the
threshold property with gap g = n− t− d.
Proof: Let η′ := η/L. We first instantiate the AMD code
of Theorem 7 for message length k and block length n0 = k+
O(log(1/η′)) ≤ k + c0(log(L/η)), for some constant c0 > 0.
Let (Enc0,Dec0) be the resulting AMD coding scheme.
We can write the code C as a direct sum C = C′ + C′′ of
complementary codes, where C′′ ⊆ FnQ is an FQ1/m -linear
sub-code of C of rate R − R′ > 0. For the sake of clarity,
in the sequel we use C0, C′0 ⊆ (FQ1/m)nm to be the codes
C, C′, respectively, when regarded as subspaces of (FQ1/m)nm
(in other words, C0, C′0 are the “unfolded” representations of
C, C′). Recall that C0, C′0 are linear codes over FQ1/m .
Let f : Fn02 → C′′ be any efficient and F2-linear invertible
function. Such a function exists since log2 |C′′| = (R −
R′)nq ≥ n0 by (1). Note that there is also an efficiently
computable F2-linear projection f ′ : FnQ → Fn02 such that for
any w ∈ C′, and any x ∈ Fn02 , we have f ′(w + f(x)) = x.
We define the secret sharing scheme (Share,Rec) as follows:
• Share: Given s ∈ Fk2 , Share(s) first computes S′ :=
Enc0(s). Then, it samples a Z ∈ FnQ according to the
uniform distribution on C′ and outputs Y := f(S′) + Z.
• Rec: Given Y ′ ∈ FnQ, the procedure Rec(Y ′) first uses the
list decoding algorithm of C to compute a list M ⊆ FnQ
of size at most L consisting of all codewords of C that
agree with Y ′ in at least 1−δ fraction of the positions. Let
M ′ ⊆ Fn02 be the set M ′ := f ′(M). If the set Dec0(M ′)\
{⊥} contains only one element, the algorithm outputs the
unique element. Otherwise, the algorithm returns ⊥.
Due to space restrictions, we defer the formal analysis of
our scheme to the full version of the paper. Intuitively, privacy
holds in a similar way as the original Shamir’s scheme, due
to the dual distance property of the subcode of C. The main
novelty is the robustness analysis, which, as briefly sketched
in §I-B, works in two steps. First, due to list decodability of
C, it is always possible to reconstruct a short list that must
contain the correct secret, along with the correct AMD tag.
The linearity property of C can be used in combination with
the properties of AMD codes to show that, with sufficient
probability, the correct secret is the only element of the list
that is tagged correctly.
IV. INSTANTIATIONS
A. Construction based on Reed-Solomon codes
In this section, we instantiate Theorem 8 using folded Reed-
Solomon codes of [15]. The result is the following theorem
whose proof appears in the full version of the work.
Theorem 9: For every integers n > t ≥ 1, g ≥ 0 and real
parameters δ, ν, η > 0 such that ρ := 1 − δ − t+g+1n > 0,
there is a q0 = O(
log2(1/ρ)
νρ2 log n) such that for any integer
q ≥ q0 the following holds. There is an efficient and perfectly
private secret sharing scheme (Share,Rec) with n shares, share
length q, privacy parameter t, threshold property with gap g,
and secret length k satisfying k ≥ (1+g−ν)q−O(log(1/η)).
Moreover, the scheme achieves a robustness parameter of δn
and robustness error η.
We remark that for any (not necessarily robust) secret
sharing scheme with threshold property and gap g, it is known
that the share length q must satisfy q ≥ k/(1 + g) (cf. [13]).
Therefore, the share length achieved by Theorem 9 is essen-
tially optimal. For the important special case of δ = t/n and
g = 0 we derive the following corollary from Theorem 9:
Corollary 10: Let δ < 1/2 be any fixed constant. For
every integer n > 1/(1 − 2δ) and η > 0 and ν > 0, there
is an efficient and perfectly private secret sharing scheme
(Share,Rec) with n shares, share length q = Oν(log n), and
secret length k ≥ q(1 − ν) − O(log(1/η)). It attains a sharp
threshold, privacy and robustness δn, and error η.
B. Reducing the share length using algebraic geometry codes
Using algebraic geometry codes instead of Reed-Solomon
codes in Theorem 8, it is possible to reduce the share length to
a constant at cost of (necessarily) introducing a nonzero gap.
Namely, by instantiating Theorem 8 with a family of folded
algebraic geometry (AG) codes in [20], the following result is
obtained (see the full version for the proof):
Theorem 11: There is a constant c0 > 0 such that the
following holds. For any constants ρ, δ > 0, there is an integer
q = Θ(log(1/ρ)/ρ2) and n0 = (1/ρ)O(1) such that for all
integers t, k and n ≥ n0 and real parameter η > 0 that satisfy
k
qn
+
t
n
+ δ ≤ 1− ρ− c0 log(1/η)
nq
(2)
the following holds. There is an efficient and perfectly private
secret sharing scheme (Share,Rec) with n shares, share length
q, privacy parameter t and secret length k. Moreover, the
scheme achieves a robustness parameter of δn and error η, and
satisfies the threshold property with gap at most n(1− tn −δ).
From this result, we obtain the following corollary (see the
full version for the proof).
Corollary 12: For any constants δ, γ, ρ > 0, there is a q0 =
O(log(1/ρ)/ρ2) and n0 = O(1/ρ) such that for all integers
c ≥ 1, the following holds. Let q := cq0. For any integers
k > 0, n ≥ n0, and parameter η > 0 such that
k
qn
+ γ + δ ≤ 1− ρ, (3)
There is a perfectly private secret sharing scheme (Share,Rec)
with n shares, secret length k, share length q, privacy pa-
rameter at least γn, and threshold property with gap at most
n(1 − δ − γ). Moreover, the scheme achieves a robustness
parameter of δn and error η = exp(−Ω(ρnq)).
Corollary 12, in turn, immediately implies the following
result on robust secret sharing with privacy and robustness
parameter δn for any δ < 1/2.
Corollary 13: For any constant ρ > 0, and any δ ≤ 1/2−ρ,
There is a q0 = O(log(1/ρ)/ρ2) such that for any q ≥ q0
and integers k > 0 and n ≥ k/(ρq), the following holds.
There is a perfectly private secret sharing scheme (Share,Rec)
with n shares, secret length k, and share length at most 2q.
The scheme attains privacy and robustness parameters equal to
δn and error η = exp(−Ω(ρnq)), and satisfies the threshold
property with gap at most 2ρn.
Compared with the result of Corollary 10 obtained from
Reed-Solomon codes, we see that the share length q can be
chosen to be a constant (depending on the difference 1/2−δ),
and at the same time the number of shares can be made
arbitrarily large as well. However, for this to be possible
when the designed share length is small, the number of shares
n needs to be large enough4 so that n ≥ k/(ρq) . In the
full version of this paper we show that this is necessary for
any robust secret sharing scheme with share length q that
attains privacy and robustness parameters close to n/2. The
proof constructs a reduction from the wiretap channel problem
to robust secret sharing and applies the known information
theoretic bounds on wiretap codes. It follows that for a general
share length q, a robust secret sharing scheme satisfying (3)
for arbitrarily small ρ > 0 is essentially optimal (even if the
threshold property is not a concern).
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